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This year we celebrate150 years of Marx’s Das Kapital and 100 years of the October 
Revolution. This coincidence, however, only further highlights the utter 
incommensurability between these two events, between the theoretical and the 
practical achievements of Marxist and communist thinking. As Slavoj Žižek suggests, 
there is something of a “parallax" between the critique of political economy and the 
political activity in Marxism, so that the proper engagement with one of the two tends 
to reduce the other to an inconsistent or even hopeless endeavour1. Usually, this is 
not taken as problematic, mostly because we are used to understanding Marx’s work 
as concerning the social organization of capitalism, while the work of revolutionaries 
would concern itself mostly with the dis-organization of this same society – so, for a 
while, we could compatibilize the objective temporality of the crises of capitalism 
with the subjective temporality of the political opportunity, the cyclical and the 
periodical points of view. However, today when the management of perpetual social 
and economic crises has become a form of government and we can no longer 
afford the luxury of concerning ourselves solely with how to undo or deconstruct pre-
established orders and norms, the problem of social organization suddenly emerges 
– perhaps for the first time – as an urgent and central concern of anti-capitalist 
militant practice. Rather than wait for us on the other side of an insurrection, the 
problem of how to relate our critical theory of capitalism and a constructive,  
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affirmative view of social relations poses itself now, as a contemporary challenge. To 
recognize the emergence of this problem is, however, to also recognize this 
incommensurability, identified by Žižek, between Marxist theory and communist 
practice: between our conceptual resources – developed in view of rendering 
capitalism intelligible – and our practical experience – focused mostly on the 
interruption of pre-existing social orders. 
 In this essay, we would like to share the partial results of the research that has 
conducted in the last five years2. CSII functions as a laboratory for collective 
organization: we gather together to study different critical theories of organization, 
distill some principles or hypotheses from this investigation which we then apply to 
our own organizational structure, transforming our process of deliberation, 
experimenting with different ways to organize the division of labor, modes to 
evaluate the success or failure of our projects, and so on. When these experiments 
lead us to interesting results we formalize these findings into projects and models 
which we offer to trade unions, social movements and political parties. In the 
following, we would like to present three general principles which we have extracted 
from our practical investigations, and which might contribute to our understanding 
the role of collective organization in our contemporary conjuncture. 
 Firstly, we might condense our current findings into three points or principles, 
which we shall expand in more detail: 
 1. It is possible to reposition the problem of how to think the relation between 
theory and practice in Marxist thinking through the inclusion of a third term which is 
symptomatically absent from the classic binomial: collective organization. A series of 
oppositions based on the conceptual pair “theory/practice” – such as the abstract 
and the concrete, the intellectual and the manual, the ideal and the material, etc –
might be reconsidered once we approach them not from the standpoint of “praxis”, 
but rather through the ontology of collective organization, which transforms this 
dualism into a complex and historicized articulation. This first point might be 
capitulated as the principle of immanent articulation, through which we conceive the 
articulation of theory and practice as a real imbrication which is localized in a given 
concrete historical moment and whose singularity is the very form of a given 
organization.  
 2. Furthermore, our theory of ideology critique might also be extended through 
an important addition, the consideration that an ideological identification is not 
simply the process of assumption of an ideal that is overdetermined by the social  
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situation, but is also an operation through which we are brought to abdicate from 
certain aspects of social reality – amongst them, tools for effective social  
 
transformation which, once rejected in the name of an identification, become the 
exclusive property of our political adversaries. From this standpoint, we could read 
Marx’s famous affirmation that the “dominant ideas are the ideas of the dominant 
class” not so much as the statement that certain ideas dominate us because they 
inherently reflect the interests of the dominant class, but rather as the proposition 
that the dominant class has the monopoly of ideas which have the power of social 
domination – specifically, of transformation, construction and maintenance of a 
social order. This process of abdication is what we call the principle of institutive 
ignorance: the proposition that the consistency of an ideological space relies on a 
gesture of abstraction, on a certain not-wanting-to-know about the traumatic 
genericity of ideas and practices. 
 3. Finally, when we recognize (1) that collective organization is the site where 
theory and practice are intermixed in a localized and experimental way, and (2) that 
the critique of ideology includes a practical dimension based on the recuperation of 
certain transformative means that we are interpellated into letting go, then it 
becomes possible to affirm that the domain of organization is the properly inventive 
dimension of politics. Because this principle states that there is a mutual conditioning 
between the future overcoming of the capitalist mode of production and the present 
capacity of collective organization to experiment with forms of articulation between 
theory and practice that offer alternatives to the formal principle of the division of 
labor we can conceptualize it as the principle of anticipated invention. That is, we are 
allowed to construct our strategic political vision out of something more concrete 
than our conjuncture analysis or our political commitments: the very interiority of 
collective organization, its infra-structure, can be taken as the ground out of which 
our extrapolation into the future can be constructed. 
 The remainder of this presentation will therefore be dedicated to a schematic 
exposition of these three principles – one on organization, one on ideology and one 
on invention. 
 
Organization: the principle of immanent articulation 
  
Today we have access to two general models or schemas for thinking the relation 
between theory and practice. The first one is, in fact, a corollary of the logic of capital,  
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which is the schema which follows from the division of labour into manual and 
intellectual labour, while the second one was developed by Marxist revolutionary 
theory, starting from its critique of the capitalist model, and is the schema of praxis as  
the “unity of theory and practice”3. We have, thus, one model of division and another 
of unity. It just so happens that there is a profound asymmetry between them.  
 The Marxist analysis of the division of labour explains the separation between 
theory and practice within bourgeois ideology through the division, proper of the 
capitalist mode of production, between those who sell and those who buy labour 
force: on the one hand, the labour which truly and effectively produces concrete 
transformations, but which also, as a commodity, is externally determined by its 
exchange value; on the other, the intellectual activity which develops the creative 
potency of man, but which, unproductive in itself, relies on the consumption of alien 
labour-commodity. In other words, it is an analysis which presents us a historically 
determined mode of articulating “hand” and “head”, and, as a consequence of this, 
“practice” and “theory” – and it is a historically determined mode of articulation 
precisely because the kernel of this analysis is not the binomial such as it is 
organized by capitalism, but the form of value as an organizing principle4. What is 
historicized by the Marxist analysis of the division of labour is, above all, the form of 
value as what both causes and articulates this division to begin with – in other words, 
it is precisely a critical attempt to grasp the historicity of that which, from the 
standpoint of the social organization of labour in capitalism, appears as an 
immutable principle. 
 The notion of praxis surely constitutes an alternative to the model of the 
division of labour, which is why it seeks to place practice in the dominant or 
determining position in the pair, thus guaranteeing that we do not take as being 
eternal the very thing that must be revolutionized. Nevertheless, while the Marxist 
critique of capitalism considers the form of value as a principle of organization of the 
material and the immaterial which is itself historical – that is, as something which has 
a beginning and an end, a place, movement, development, etc – the concept of 
praxis functions as a regulative, transhistorical category, proposing an ideal unity 
between theory and practice. It is important to note that we are not saying that 
revolutionary praxis is not historical or context-driven – of course, when we place 
practice as the “determinant in the last instance”, the concept of praxis is guaranteed 
to steer us through the real socio-historical transformations, and not by mere 
interpretation of reality such as it appears to us. The point is rather that the concept 
of praxis is not itself historical, that is, it localizes and orders the relation between the  
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concrete and the abstract, between the effective material and the reflective ideal, but 
it is not itself localizable and sequential. There is an asymmetry here because, while 
there is a history of the form of value, of the different moments of organization and 
social mediation brought about through this form, there is no history of praxis. 
 An important consequence follows from the lack of historicity in the concept of 
praxis. What comes to fill this lack is usually a reference to either ethics or science. 
The concept of praxis substitutes this third, lacking term – which corresponds to the 
historically determined dimension of social organization – for references to the 
individual experience of the militant, i.e. one's ethical rigour5, since one should avoid 
to reproduce in one’s actions the capitalist division of labour, or to the rigour of 
Marx's method6, and warning us to focus on the concrete analysis of conjunctures so 
as to avoid the dangers of subjectively deforming one’s political orientation. These 
two conceptual "loans", modelling praxis on ethics or on science, have been useful 
in the construction of a reference point for militant activity that is affirmatively distinct 
from forms of labour within the capitalist mode of production. However, it is here we 
find two important limitations.  
 The first appears in the field of ethics, given that the spectrum of conduct does 
not simply oscillate between rectitude and corruption – that is, between the attention 
and the lassitude concerning an ideal – but also includes the difference between 
following a principle and following an injunction7. When we count on ethics to 
guarantee the ideal unity between theory and practice we also open the way for the 
paradoxes of the superego: the inversion through which a subject's ideal stops 
serving the purpose of transforming reality and it is reality which starts to be 
transformed in order to maintain one’s particular subjective position. It might seem 
like an irrelevant or secondary question for political practice, but this inversive logic 
can, sometimes, lead to an antinomy between the identity of the militant and the 
consequences of militancy. For example, it can render unbearable the suspensive 
moment in which one might have to leave aside an identifiable revolutionary trait in 
order to adapt revolutionary theory to novel social and historical constraints – much 
like a scientist who needs to turn his back on reality, towards the blackboard, in order 
to better understand reality itself.  It is a problem directly connected to the question of 
identity and identification, and the great examples range from the well-known 
tensions between the peasants and the workers in the early years of the Soviet 
revolution8, all the way to the contemporary “revolt of the salaried bourgeoisie”9 and 
its impotent response when confronted with the reactionary sentiments of working  
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class people. The “contradictions within the people” always evoke this impasse – 
and, as we will argue, so does the “antagonistic contradictions” with our enemies. 
 The second limitation of the paradigm of praxis appears in the alternative 
reference to science. Here the main concern is not so much practical rigor, but 
theoretical rigor – the rectitude of the revolutionary in his use of theory. The lack of a 
history of the different and determinate modes of articulating the material and 
immaterial aspects, akin in its plasticity to the value-form, appears now even more 
clearly, for this absence is reflected onto a telling deformation of the scientific model 
by Marxist theory. It is impossible to understand the historical development of 
scientific thinking simply in terms of theory and practice: it is also necessary to take 
note of the evolution of the experimental apparatus – that is, the formal protocols 
through which science makes nature intelligible not for a mere accidental observer 
of a given phenomenon, but to anyone who places herself in accordance with these 
artificial parameters10. It is truly essential to realize that the universality of scientific 
results is also conditioned by the universality of the means of production of science. 
Both the theoretical language as well as the practical restrictions here are 
intrinsically informed by the reference to the historical and geographical organization 
of the scientific community11: these conditions are neither immutable nor culturally 
variable, neither indifferent to time and space, but also not reducible to them – this 
dimension of scientific thinking demands a continuous adjustment of the scientific 
apparatus, without which it is not only impossible to communicate and verify the 
results obtained by a given research, but even to produce such results. This is 
precisely what the deformed model of scientific activity borrowed and transformed 
by Marxism is incapable of considering: the experimental dimension in science 
names the impersonal, but localized, ordered and transmissible history of the 
different articulations between scientific theory and practice. This dimension is 
absent in Marxism’s understanding of “scientific praxis” because it is, more 
fundamentally, also absent in our own conception of political practice. 
 Rather than doing away with this absence by conceptually borrowing from 
ethics or science, it is up for political thinking itself to unearth its own category of the 
historically determined mediator between theory and practice. This is what the 
“principle of immanent articulation” seeks to address: (i) a consideration of the role of 
the form of value in the division of labour; (ii) a diagnosis of the ahistorical aspects of 
the concept of praxis as the ideal unity between theory and practice; and (iii) an 
analysis of the deficiencies which follow from the improper supplementation of the 
inherent lack in the concept of praxis through extra-political means, coming from  
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ethics or science. We can now grasp the positive challenge which this principle 
evokes for us: the restitution of the category of organization as a field in which we 
experiment, in a transmissible and localizable way, the different modulations of the 
articulation between theory and practice. However, this entails rehabilitating the 
political potential of a dimension of organization – the realm of rules, of impersonal 
mediations, of formal protocols, etc – which is today simply identified as constitutive 
part of the capitalist mode of production. 
 
Ideology: the principle of institutive ignorance 
 
We can now turn to the second principle we would like to put forward: the “principle 
of institutive ignorance”. This principle also has a history – a history which, curiously 
enough, can only be reconstructed once we have accepted the previous principle, 
the one which affirms the formal dimension of organization to be the concrete 
mediator between theory and practice. We would like to begin by mentioning an 
example, before we consider this principle in its generalized formulation. 
 Our example concerns the relation between the French Revolution and the 
Haitian Revolution. We all know how the struggle in the name of the modern ideals 
of freedom, fraternity and equality did not stop France from having many slave 
colonies, Haiti amongst them. Thus far the story is just like many others in which 
bourgeois ideals, based on an abstract notion of man, show themselves to be 
perfectly compatible with the exploitation of the concrete man. What interests us, 
however, is the other side of the question: not so much the separation of the French 
universalist ideals from the reality of the Haitian slaves, but the role played by these 
ideals in the anti-colonial struggle, which led Haiti to become the first free nation in 
Latin America. In his discussion of the Haitian Revolution, Žižek highlights precisely 
this question, through recourse to a paradigmatic moment in the revolt of Saint 
Domingos: 
 
In Haiti, the unthinkable ( for the European Enlightenment) took place: the 
Haitian Revolution "entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being 
unthinkable even as it happened:', The ex-slaves of Haiti took the French 
revolutionary slogans more literally than did the French themselves: they 
ignored all the implicit qualifications which abounded in Enlightenment 
ideology (freedom – but only for rational "mature" subjects, not for the wild 
immature barbarians who first had to undergo a long process of education  
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in order to deserve freedom and equality …). This led to sublime 
"communist" moments, like the one that occurred when French soldiers 
(sent by Napoleon to suppress the rebellion and restore slavery) 
approached the black army of (self-)liberated slaves. When they heard an 
initially indistinct murmur coming from the black crowd, the soldiers at first 
assumed it must be some kind of tribal war chant; but as they came closer, 
they realized that the Haitians were singing the Marseillaise, and they  
started to wonder out loud whether they were not fighting on the wrong 
side. Events such as these enact universality as a political category.12 
 
 The central point of this anecdote – one which, we believe, the analysis of the 
invention of the modern army and the role of militarization in the soviet experience 
would undoubtedly also confirm13 –  is that the critique of ideology responsible for the 
spiritual freedom of the slaves was not the one which freed them from the French 
ideals, but the one which freed those ideals from the monopoly of the French 
themselves. As we have already mentioned, this entails a different reading of the 
famous definition of ideology found in the The German Ideology: the dominating 
ideas are the ideas of the dominant class not (only) because they are inherently 
classist, but because the access to some ideas and to certain conceptual tools 
remain restricted to the dominant class. This domination takes place in many ways –
one of them is certainly intellectual property – but the way which interests us here is 
the one which names our second principle: the “institutive ignorance”. 
 This principle proposes a supplementation of the apparatuses of ideological 
critique based upon the premise that contemporary ideology functions exclusively 
through co-optation, through the production of positive identifications with the 
capitalist imaginary. There is also a dimension to ideology which leads us to 
abdicate certain emblems in name of negative identifications. Just as a Haitian slave 
surely would have difficulty to recognize himself freed from the French while quoting 
Danton or Robespierre, today we have a veritable and unbearable difficulty of putting 
some of the resources developed by the dominant class to work to our advantage. 
But just as the Haitian slave managed to free himself at the moment he could 
separate the mobilizing potential of the universalist emblems from the idea that this 
potential was indissociable from the colonizers, so too must we learn today how to 
separate the potential of certain tools and contemporary ideas from the immediate 
feeling that these resources and experiences indelibly belong to our enemies. 
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 The “principle of institutive ignorance” suggests, therefore, that there is a 
dimension of ideological alienation which is effected not through the unproductive 
alienation in a mystifying ideal, but rather through the avoidance of a productive  
alienation in a rational idea. The dispute for the centrality of organization – the 
question at stake in our first “principle” – is an example of this “alienation of 
alienation”: is it not, in fact, precisely this the argument that we use in order to justify 
our suspicion against the party-form, against discipline, against power, against any 
serious assessment of the reality of socialist experiences in the 20th Century14 – in 
sum, against everything which brings into play the relation between the formal 
dimension of organization and power? This articulation, we say, is “in itself” 
bourgeois, it "belongs" to the dominant class – while remaining ignorant to the fact 
that it is this very consent which institutes the class character of the dominating 
ideas. Recuperating the role of organization as that which allows us to reorder the 
history of political emancipation, to return to the investigation of new forms of 
discipline, to take back utopian imagination – which, after all, refers to the future 
organization and administration of life – perhaps means to the current capitalist 
reality what the recuperation of universalism meant for the anti-colonial struggle in 
1804. 
 It is important, finally, to note that this dimension of ideology critique cannot 
take place within theory, because this “knowledge” which we ignore is eminently a 
practical knowledge: the Haitian slave might very well have known everything about 
the French ideals, it was not his consciousness which was alienated from the 
potential at stake in these emblems – the overcoming of this ignorance which 
institutes the monopoly of the dominant class over certain ideas is a practical one 
and in this lies its greatest challenge. The practical critique of this ignorance implies 
the subjective assumption of certain ideals which, seen from the standpoint of the 
situation, would lead us to sacrifice our identity and “surrender" to the enemy. But, 
more importantly, this overcoming implies our capacity to criticize the cohesion of 
the Left built through the resistance to the ideals of the dominant class in the name 
of the possibility of a rational organization of this same Left. And this critique no one 
can accomplish alone: a slave who starts to speak of European universalism amidst 
the suspicious silence of his fellows is just a traitor – and the ethics of praxis could 
surely attest to this. It is only when this universalism is put to the test of organizing the 
revolt of these same slaves against their colonizers that this assumption can 
consolidate its critical potential.  
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 At this precise point, ideological critique and collective organization meet and 
our first principle, concerning the role of organization as the concrete mediation of 
theory and practice, is confirmed. The traversal of the institutive ignorance might very 
well be a militant task, but it must be mediated by collective organization, which is 
the site of the struggle for the ideas which are capable of social synthesis. 
 
Invention: the principle of anticipated invention. 
 
At first, it seems possible to partially deduce our third principle from the previous two: 
if the field of organization is the one which offers an immanent mediation between 
theory and practice, and if there is a dimension of ideology which concerns our  
capacity to fight over ideas which, from the standpoint of our current identity as 
militants, are seen as adjective property (rather than private property) of the 
dominant class, then there exists a terrain – the field of collective organization - 
where currently unthinkable possibilities – for thinking them is the prerogative of our 
enemies – might gain reality in the present, and we might verify their innovative 
potential through the transformation in our capacity to collectively mobilize ourselves 
effected by this process of separation from the sphere of negative identifications. 
 Not everything, however, is contained in the previous two principles. This new 
proposition, which invites us to re-articulate the relation between tactics and strategy, 
suggests a transformation in our understanding of the relation between means and 
ends. When we solely work with the classic pair of theory and practice, we lack the 
necessary resources to escape that which we could call “functional work”15 – that is, a 
theory of transformation of the world based on the capitalist notion of concrete 
labour. Functional work is work which transforms raw material into a product, 
according to a certain finality and a certain method. Not even revolutionary praxis 
manages to think itself in terms that are truly distinct from this basic schema: it is a 
matter of transforming the capitalist world into another world, in accordance with the 
communist ideal and the Marxist method, such as they are understood and 
determined today or have been in the past. The problem here is that the only thing 
we truly know about communism today is that we don’t really know anything about it 
– in fact, almost all the conceptual and experimental tools which we could mobilize 
to imagine a possible communism require the submission to aspects of rationality 
and universalism which, in accordance to the principle of institutive ignorance, we 
have already identified with the submission to the dominant class. 
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 We need, therefore, a way of orienting the militant practice which cannot be 
reduced to the mere application of an ahistorical ideal, not even to the ahistorical 
ideal of the “historical praxis”. The relation between communism and anarchism 
could perhaps be better understood as a symptom of this precise problem: 
communists, rightly so, do not let go of a future orientation towards power, but end 
up paralyzed by an unproductive excess of determinations (in our analytical power, 
use of previous historical models, anamnesis of class composition, etc), while 
anarchists, rightly so, do not let go of a critique of functional work, but end up 
paralyzed by an unproductive excess of indeterminations (in the directional force of 
transformation, in the purely negative space of militant identities, etc). What is lacking 
in both cases is precisely the return to the centrality of organizational 
experimentation: as Kant proposes in his analysis of natural teleology “an organized 
natural product is one in which each part is reciprocally a means and an end”. In  
other words, “to organize” means to promote an immanent – “intrinsic”, was Kant’s 
term – interpenetration between means and ends, between the rules of 
transformation and the transformed product16.  
 This strange inversion or interpenetration between means and ends was in 
fact already connected to collective organization by Marx himself. There is a famous 
fragment in Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts which reads as follows: 
 
In order to supersede the idea of private property, the idea of communism 
is enough. In order to supersede private property as it actually exists, real 
communist activity is necessary. History will give rise to such activity, and 
the movement which we already know in thought to be a self-superseding 
movement will in reality undergo a very difficult and protracted process. 
But we must look upon it as a real advance that we have gained, at the 
outset, an awareness of the limits as well as the goal of this historical 
movement and are in a position to see beyond it. 
 When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is 
instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time, they acquire a new 
need – the need for society – and what appears as a means had become 
an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the 
gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating, and drinking, etc., 
are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, 
association, conversation, which in turn has society as its goal, is enough  
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for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and 
the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures17 
 
 First of all, Marx distinguishes the “idea” from the “real activity”: the idea of 
private property from its actual existence, the idea of communism from its real 
movement. As usual, with Marx, this is not merely a distinction of registers, between 
the abstract and the concrete presentation of a given thing. The idea of communism 
can in fact work against the real communist movement, insofar as, from the 
standpoint of an idea that has no effective reality, “the real estrangement of human 
life remains and is all the greater the more one is conscious of it as such”. The actual 
communist movement, however, does not overcome the actual relations mediated 
by private property so easily as its ideal version: communist practice, in reality, moves 
slowly, step by step, it undergoes “a very difficult and protracted process”. However, 
Marx suggests that the very shift away from the abstract realm of the idea to the 
harsh reality of concrete struggle is already “real advance”: being aware of “the limits 
as well as the goal of this historical movement” constitutes our first victory as 
communists. There is a great sense of pragmatic realism here, a true conviction that 
being exposed to our real limitations is preferable to being trapped in a dream of 
great things, without actuality.  
 The second paragraph, however, introduces a strange twist into this 
orientation. Marx stops speaking of communist strategy in general terms and turns to 
the “communist workmen” gathered together for the purposes of accomplishing 
some tasks of importance for the political movement: agitation, propaganda, political 
formation. This active movement, a painfully difficult process of liberation - which is a 
hundred times more important than the work of philosophers, seating home, aloof, 
thinking of the idea of freedom - is nonetheless suddenly interrupted or distorted by 
the appearance of “a new need”.  
 This new need has a very peculiar structure, because, unlike the “real 
estrangement of human life”, which can only be superseded by the actual 
overcoming of private property, it can find satisfaction in the present, in the very 
process of socialization of workers. This new need inverts the relation between 
means and ends: rather than organize in order to accomplish certain tasks of interest 
for the movement, the communist workmen take part in the harsh struggle for actual 
communism so that they can engage in “smoking, eating and drinking”. In a sense, 
they become, in their pleasure in “company, association, conversation”, like the lazy  
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philosophers Marx had criticized, who think of communism for the mere pleasure of 
thinking. However, here, the free association of men, unlike in the case of the  
philosopher, freely associating ideas, is a reality. A reality which Marx emphatically 
praises, even though it does not present itself as an effective contribution to the 
actually existing communist movement.  
 This “new need”, which rather appears as a new satisfaction, an uncalled for 
pleasure, makes in fact a sudden and unwanted appearance. From the standpoint of 
those who, having abandoned the narcissistic satisfaction of wallowing in the ideal, 
dedicate themselves to the actual communist practice, with all its grit and 
frustrations, to suddenly have their hard-earned efforts of collective mobilization 
turned into a “mere” means for people to gather and talk can only be experienced as 
a deviation, a stoppage or even a betrayal. But they are powerless against it. As 
Jacques Rancière puts it: 
 
Here is the problem that is likely to transform the enthusiasm of the 
communist into the despair of the revolutionary - the nobility of humanity 
already shining on brows that should have lost even the appearance of it in 
order to produce the future of humanity. [..] The obstacle to the 
transformation of Straubinger communists into revolutionary proletarians is 
not their status as artisans, but their status as communists - not the heavy 
weight of their journeyman past but the lightness of their anticipation of the 
communist future18  
 
The principle of anticipated invention seeks to bring to light the material basis of the 
future which the inversion of means and ends promoted by the logic of collective 
organization, proposing a mutual conditioning of the determinations of the world-to-
come and the determinations of what is possible to accomplish today. Against 
functional work – and with the anarchists – this principle draws our attention to the 
experimentations concerning the relation between power and universalism today. 
However, breaking away from the identification of power and the power of the 
dominant class – and, therefore, siding with the communists – this principle also 
suggests that we must judge the validity of our tactical commitments from the 
standpoint of what these actual collective experiments teach us about what we are 
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To conclude: on impersonal emancipation 
 
In order to lead us into some concluding remarks, let us briefly mention the two most 
common responses to a diagnosis, proposed by thinkers such as Moishe Postone19 
and Anselm Jappe20, that the structure of social domination under contemporary 
capitalism is essentially abstract and impersonal, extracting its power and effectivity 
from the very impossibility of reducing this structure to the actors which compose its 
material substratum. When confronted with this position, we usually take one of two 
positions. The first is to negate that domination under capitalism is truly abstract – 
suggesting, for example, that the abstract domination is just a mystification of the 
direct and personal domination forces which are truly the root of the social 
organization under capitalism. The second position is to accept the diagnosis, but to 
answer that it is precisely because the force of capital lies in abstraction and 
impersonality that in our struggle against the abstract power of capital we should 
negate abstraction and opt for immediate concreteness and the interpersonality of 
social relations.  
 In other words, either the force of capital is not truly abstract, but conceptually 
reducible to the action of concrete people like us, or it is effectively abstract, and this 
is why, in order to oppose it, we should also oppose abstraction. The first option 
seems deficient to us because it cannot properly deal with the theory of abstract 
domination, but it has the advantage of thinking political struggle in terms of a 
confrontation where it is not simply a matter of accumulating forces, but also of 
acquiring the same “form” as that of the enemy: the issue is that this form is taken to 
be that of direct force – direct relations of domination should be confronted with the 
force of an equally direct emancipatory movement. The second option, on the other 
hand, has the advantage of recognizing the paradoxical quality of capital’s power, 
but it responds to it in an insufficient manner, promoting a properly ontological 
disparity between the poison and its cure, so to speak: against the efficacy of the 
abstract and the masterless structures which characterize capitalism, one proposed 
the power of concrete and localized struggle, of direct mobilization of concrete 
people, whose efficacy would be guaranteed by its “concreteness”.  
 But there is a third option, which we could call that of “impersonal 
emancipation”: to recognize the conceptual validity of the diagnosis proposed above, 
therefore assuming the theoretical stance that abstractions have effective causal 
power in the mechanisms of domination in capitalism, without thereby accepting the 
presupposition that to oppose abstract domination means to oppose the domination  
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of the abstract. That is, to preserve the idea, at stake in the first option, that it is 
necessary to confront the enemy’s forces with a power that is ontologically of the 
same form as it: against the abstract and impersonal social domination, this position 
demands an abstract and impersonal social emancipation, irreducible to the actors 
involved in this struggle or to those who benefit from its results. 
 In this essay, we have first presented the principle of “immanent articulation”, 
in opposition to the theory of praxis. We criticized this theory on two accounts. Firstly, 
because it relies on an ahistorical concept which lacks the potential to be affected by 
its own historical deployment – unlike the unifying principle of capitalism itself, the 
form of value. However, we also criticized this because the idealist framework that it 
implies reflects itself historically as an unmeasured trust in the immediacy of the 
unity between theory and practice (an immediacy that can take the form of a model 
for revolution as well as a "spontaneist" or vitalist theory of creative unity in practice). 
The use we make of ethical rectification or of “scientific” positioning, as conceptual 
loans supposed to supplant the lack of a theory of formal organization, demarcate 
very well that the “scale” in which this immediate unity is supposed to take place is 
precisely that of the personal domain. In short, from the standpoint of the “unity of 
theory and practice” the point of synthesis between actions and ideas is the 
individual consciousness. It is through an exam of consciousness – be it an ethical or 
scientific one – that we verify if a given political orientation, in a given conjuncture, 
has realized what was theoretically anticipated, or if a disjunction between our ideals 
and reality has taken place. 
 It is truly quite hard to imagine what other concrete instance could serve as 
unifying stance rather than one’s consciousness. Our proposal is that "collective 
organization"" is precisely the name of such immanent and historical mediation 
between theory and practice, a field simultaneously abstract and concrete, where 
the fundamental disjunction between ideas and the effective transformation of reality 
is not overcome, but put to use through local articulations. These “knottings" do not 
promote a more intimate or complete interpenetration between our theoretical 
principles and our practices, on the contrary: it becomes even more evident to 
everyone – and therefore also more transmissible – how much of what has been 
professed by a given organization was effectively transposable into its practical 
reality. This is so because organizing does not strive to unify an experience, but 
rather to produce an experiment. The difference here being, precisely, that an 
experiment – in art, love, science, and, we believe, also in politics – is conditioned on 
a violence perpetrated against the properly personal dimension in all of us: the  
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capacity of anyone to recognize oneself beside oneself – if we can call this 
recognition – in a procedure that gains in universality what is loses in similitude or 
transitivity with its actors. 
 We are left to wonder what sort of freedom could be conditioned by such 
abstract structure – to logistical solutions, to protocols, to questions of resource 
distribution, in sum: to the administrative dimension of political life. In our discussion 
of the principle of “institutive ignorance”, we mentioned an example of how freeing 
oneself from one’s own identity, itself constructed in parity with the identity of our 
adversaries, is also to free oneself to appropriate ideas which, in truth, do not belong 
to anyone. This is surely a vague – but valid – example of how taking collective 
organization as the site of concrete verification of the articulation between ideas and 
practice – in the case of Haiti, the site where we verify the capacity of French ideals 
to mobilize the revolt of the ex-slaves – allows us to experiment, simultaneously, an 
emancipation from others and from ourselves. 
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